Office - Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
AUG 13 1982
ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,
CLERK

No. 81-1581

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1981

ANTONE OLIM, EDITH M. WILHELM, JOHN SMYTHE, WINTON LEONG, and EDWIN SHIMODA,
Petitioners,

vs.

DELBERT KAAHANUI WAKINEKONA,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF THE STATES OF ALASKA, ARIZONA, FLORIDA, IDAHO, LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI, MONTANA, NEBRASKA, NEVADA, NEW JERSEY, NEW MEXICO, NORTH CAROLINA, NORTH DAKOTA, OHIO, RHODE ISLAND, SOUTH DAKOTA, TENNESSEE, VERMONT, VIRGINIA, WASHINGTON, WEST VIRGINIA, WISCONSIN, WYOMING, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES TERRITORY OF AMERICAN SAMOA

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS, AMICI CURIAE

PAUL L. DOUGLAS
Attorney General of Nebraska
J. KIRK BROWN
Assistant Attorney General
2115 State Capitol
Lincoln, NE 68509-4906
Tel: (402) 471-2682
Attorneys for Amici

COCKLE PRINTING CO., 2311 Douglas St., Omaha 68102

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the failure of state prison personnel to afford a state prisoner the exact manner of pre-transfer hearing established by state prison regulations implicates the Due Process Clause where absolutely no restraint or conditions are imposed by state law upon the ultimate decision of prison officials to execute the transfer in question.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Question Presented	i
Table of Contents	ii
Table of Authorities	iii
Opinions Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Interest of the Amici Curiae	2
Constitutional Provision Involved	3
Statutes Involved	4
Statement of the Case	4
Summary of Argument	6
Argument:	
Introduction	7
I. The Source of the Predicate Right	8
II. The Contrary Authority	10
III. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis	11
IV. The Purpose of State Procedures	14
Conclusion	16
Appendix	App. 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Pages

CASES:

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979) 14

Cofone v. Manson, 594 F. 2d 934 (2d Cir. 1979) 11

Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458 (1981) 9, 10, 12, 15

Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) 8, 9, 12, 15

Lamb v. Hutto, 467 F. Supp. 562 (E. D. Va. 1979) 13

Lokey v. Richardson, 600 F. 2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1979), *cert. denied*, 449 U. S. 884 13

Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Hawaii —, 621 P. 2d 976 (1981) 6, 10

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976) 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16

Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236 (1976) 10, 13

Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199 (1974) 13

Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F. 2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1977) 13

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980) 9, 12

Wakinekona v. Olim, 459 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978) 2

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974) 8, 9, 14, 15

CONSTITUTION:

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 ..... 3, 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pages

STATUTES:

28 U. S. C. § 1254(1) 2

42 U. S. C. § 1983 ..... 3, 4

Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 353-18 4

No. 81-1581

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1981

ANTONE OLIM, EDITH M. WILHELM, JOHN SMYTHE, WINTON LEONG, and EDWIN SHIMODA,
Petitioners,

vs.

DELBERT KAAHANUI WAKINEKONA,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF THE STATES OF ALASKA, ARIZONA, FLORIDA, IDAHO, LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI, MONTANA, NEBRASKA, NEVADA, NEW JERSEY, NEW MEXICO, NORTH CAROLINA, NORTH DAKOTA, OHIO, RHODE ISLAND, SOUTH DAKOTA, TENNESSEE, VERMONT, VIRGINIA, WASHINGTON, WEST VIRGINIA, WISCONSIN, WYOMING, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES TERRITORY OF AMERICAN SAMOA

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS, AMICI CURIAE

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is attached to the Petition for Certiorari as Appendix A.

Its Order and Amendment of Opinion is attached to the Petition for Certiorari as Appendix B. That decision reversed the judgment of the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii, attached to the Petition for Certiorari as Appendix C.

The Ninth Circuit decision was published in the advance sheets as 646 F. 2d 378, but was withdrawn from the bound volume at the request of the court. The District Court of Hawaii decision was published as *Wakinekona v. Olim*, 459 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was entered on May 26, 1981 (Appendix A, at A-1, attached to the Petition for Certiorari). The judgment was amended on November 27, 1981 (Appendix B, at B-1, attached to the Petition for Certiorari). The Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Suggestion for Rehearing *En Banc* was denied on November 27, 1981 (Appendix B, at B-1, attached to the Petition for Certiorari). The majority of the Ninth Circuit voted against rehearing (Appendix B, at B-1, attached to the Petition for Certiorari). The jurisdiction of this Court was invoked by petitioners under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

The states noted above, by and through their respective Attorneys General (*see* Appendix), respectfully offer this brief as *amici curiae*, in support of the petitioners in

this case. As the chief legal officers of their respective states, it is the duty of these Attorneys General to advise the legislatures and correctional administrators of their states regarding the legal impact of their actions and enactments. Furthermore, it is the duty of these Attorneys General to represent the correctional administrators of their states in federal courts in litigation initiated pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983, such as the present case. Corporation Counsel has the same duties with respect to the District of Columbia. For these reasons, the *amici* have a substantial and continuing interest in the balancing of state versus federal interests in state correctional facilities and the administration and supervision of that balance by the federal courts through 42 U. S. C. § 1983 litigation.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1:

> Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

STATUTES INVOLVED

Hawaii Revised Statutes, Section 353-18:

> § 353-18 *Transfer of prisoner to federal institution.* The director of social services shall, with the approval of the governor, effect the transfer of a state prisoner to any federal correctional institution for imprisonment, subsistence, care, and proper employment of such a prisoner.

42 U. S. C. § 1983, *Civil action for deprivation of rights:*

> Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent, sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by a Hawaii state court, was an inmate of the maximum control unit of the Hawaii State Prison. "He is considered to be the most dangerous and assaultive inmate in the Hawaii prison system." Appendix A, at A-2, attached to the Petition for Certiorari.

On August 10, 1976, respondent appeared before a prison program committee to evaluate his overall prison

placement, including the possibility of a mainland transfer. After the hearing, the committee recommended to the prison administrator that respondent be transferred to the mainland. Appendix A, at A-2, attached to the Petition for Certiorari.

The prison administrator affirmed the recommendation and transferred respondent to Folsom State Prison in California. Under Rule IV, the administrator had plenary and unfettered discretion to "[a]ffirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the recommendation" of the program committee. Appendix D, at D-5, attached to the Petition for Certiorari.

Respondent filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, alleging, *inter alia,* that the procedures adhered to in his transfer hearing were in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that, under Rule IV (Appendix D, attached to the Petition for Certiorari), the prison administration had unlimited discretion, not subject to standards governing the exercise thereof, to transfer prisoners to the mainland. It therefore concluded that since respondent's transfer did not implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest, due process did not attach. *See* Appendix C, attached to the Petition for Certiorari.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a split (2 to 1) decision, reversed on the ground that the right to a state-guaranteed procedural hearing in Rule IV creates a "justifiable expectation" in having a hearing before transfer and thus triggers the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution. *See* Appendix A, attached to the Petition for Certiorari. The Ninth Circuit nevertheless recognized that its conclusion was in conflict with the "First, Second, and Sixth Circuits." Appendix A, at A-7, attached to the Petition for Certiorari.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Suggestion for Rehearing *En Banc* alleging, *inter alia*, that a recent Hawaii Supreme Court case (*Lono v. Arigoshi*, Hawaii, 63 Hawaii —, 621 P. 2d 976 (1981), (Appendix E, attached to the Petition for Certiorari)) held that Rule IV's hearing procedure did not trigger due process protections:

> Thus . . . Rule IV of the Rules did not clothe plaintiff with the requisite liberty interest which would have triggered the application of the procedural requirements under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, Appendix E, at E-11, attached to the Petition for Certiorari.

The Ninth Circuit denied the motion in a split, 2 to 1, decision on November 27, 1981. *See*, Appendix B, attached to the Petition for Certiorari.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to protect a person's life, liberty or property. A state prisoner may be afforded a substantive liberty interest, protected by the Due Process Clause, by state law which restricts or preconditions the otherwise absolute discretion of those persons supervising the prisoner's incarceration. The pred-

icate to the invocation of the Due Process Clause is the existence of a substantive liberty interest created by state law.

The creation of state administrative procedures which in no manner limit or restrict the discretion of a state prison administrator's decision to transfer a prisoner cannot, alone, implicate the Due Process Clause as they create no substantive liberty interest in the prisoner.

The decision of the appeals court below is not supported by previous decisions of this Court and is directly contrary to the ruling of other circuits which have considered this question.

It would be contrary to the ultimate goal of the Due Process Clause—the elimination of arbitrary government action—to discourage states from formalizing information gathering procedures prior to the making of a discretionary administrative decision, particularly in situations where no substantive liberty interest has been created by state law.

ARGUMENT

INTRODUCTION

The Due Process Clause does not protect process. It protects a person's right to life, liberty or property. In this case the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (hereinafter the Ninth Circuit) has held that state created procedures are protected by the Due Process Clause. Apparently that court would argue that one can-

not be denied state afforded process without first being provided federally required process, regardless of whether a substantive liberty interest is implicated. This is process protecting process. It is not process protecting substantive rights, and it is not the purpose of the Due Process Clause.

I.

The Source of the Predicate Right

The initial inquiry in any case concerning the Due Process Clause must be whether the governmental action in question infringed or implicated an interest in life, liberty or property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U. S. 215, 223 (1976). Insofar as a state prisoner is concerned, his liberty interests may have one of two sources. He may have a liberty interest created by the Constitution or it may be created by state law. *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U. S. 539, 557 (1974).

One must first determine *if* a liberty interest exists at all.

> Decisions of the Executive Branch, however serious their impact, do not automatically invoke due process protection; there simply is no constitutional guarantee that all executive decisionmaking must comply with standards that assure error-free determinations.

Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 7 (1979).

To determine if a liberty interest has been created one must look to a *source* of the substantive rights which might give rise to that interest.

> The ground for a constitutional claim, if any, must be found in statutes or other rules defining the obligations of the [responsible governmental entity].

Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 465 (1981).

In previous prison transfer cases this Court has noted that many states afford their prisoners no reasonable basis to anticipate that they will not be transferred to other correctional facilities and that the mere absence of that state assurance does not implicate due process.

> Here, Massachusetts law conferred no right on the prisoner to remain in the prison to which he was initially assigned, defeasible only upon proof of specific acts of misconduct. . . . On the contrary, transfer in a wide variety of circumstances is vested in prison officials. The *predicate* for invoking the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment as construed and applied in *Wolff v. McDonnell* [supra] is totally nonexistant in this case.

(Emphasis added.) *Meachum v. Fano, supra* at 226 (1976). The "predicate" to invoking the Due Process Clause is a *substantive*, state afforded liberty interest, not state afforded procedures. In each instance in which this Court has held the Due Process Clause applicable to a state prisoner's claim a substantive expectation of *liberty*, not procedure, has been found in state law. *Wolff v. McDonnell, supra*, a right to *early release* based upon state afforded good time credit; *Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra*, expectation of *parole* upon achieving certain statutory conditions; *Vitek v. Jones*, 445 U. S. 480 (1980), expectation that a state prisoner would not be involuntarily transferred to a mental hospital unless certain statutory criteria were found to exist.

In other cases considered by this Court, where a predicate substantive right to liberty was not found in state law, the Due Process Clause was not found applicable to state *procedures* involved in making the administrative decisions involved. *Meachum v. Fano, supra,* and *Montanye v. Haymes,* 427 U. S. 236 (1976), no state law restrictions on decision to transfer a prisoner; *Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, supra,* no state law restrictions upon the discretion of the state pardon board's grant of commutation or clemency.

In the present case there exists absolutely no basis for the conclusion that the substantive, state created liberty interest necessarily predicate to the invocation of the Due Process Clause is present in the transfer regulations of the State of Hawaii. Absolutely no restraint or restriction is placed upon the ultimate administrative determination of whether to transfer the prisoner in question. *Lono v. Ariyoshi,* 621 P. 2d 976 (Hawaii 1981). It is the decision to transfer which impacts the respondent's liberty interest, not the purely advisory state created process which precedes that decision, and it is the decision to transfer which is unrestricted by state law. The discretion of the governmental decisionmaker in this instance is no more fettered than was that of his counterpart in *Meachum v. Fano, supra.* The facts of these cases being strikingly similar if not identical, the outcome of these cases should not be the sole means of distinguishing them.

II.

The Contrary Authority

The great weight of authority throughout the circuits is consistent with the preceding analysis and totally at

odds with the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case. Decisions of the other circuits are noted on pages 6 and 7 of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Perhaps the most concise articulation of the majority position on this matter is found in *Cofone v. Manson*, 594 F. 2d 934, 938 (2d Cir. 1979).

> Although the intendment of § 18-78a(b) may be ambiguous regarding what, if any, specific procedural safeguards Connecticut officials must observe before transferring a state prisoner, it is clear that the statute is not the source of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Although a Due Process Clause liberty interest may be grounded in state law that places substantive limits on the authority of state officials, no comparable entitlement can derive from a statute that merely establishes procedural requirements.

III.

The Ninth Circuit's Analysis

A.

Although the Ninth Circuit's opinion pays lip service to the "substantive right" concept, it quickly substitutes the *presence* of state afforded procedures for the *existence* of the predicate state afforded liberty interest.

> We believe that the regulations in this case create a justifiable expectation that a prison transfer involving a "grievous loss" will not be carried out unless certain *procedures* are followed.

(Emphasis added.) Petition for Certiorari, at A-6.

There is no support in the previous rulings of this Court for the proposition that state afforded *procedures*

can create the substantive liberty interest necessary to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. To the contrary, this Court has previously noted that state afforded procedures are wholly irrelevant to a Due Process Clause analysis.

> These minimum [procedural] requirements being a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate determining the preconditions to adverse official action. . . . In like manner, Nebraska's reliance on the opinion of a designated physician or psychologist for determining whether the conditions warranting transfer exist neither removes the prisoner's interest from due process protection nor answers the question of what process is due under the Constitution.

Vitek v. Jones, supra at 491. As state created procedures do not describe the process due under the Constitution when substantive liberty interests are present, neither should they be the source of the predicate substantive right which calls the Due Process Clause into play in the first instance.

This Court has specifically rejected the argument that state procedures can give birth to substantive rights protected by the Constitution. In *Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, supra* at 465, the prisoner had argued that the procedures and practices of the state board of pardons had created the "expectation of liberty" discussed in *Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra.* This Court dismissed that contention and warned that "a contrary conclusion would trivialize the Constitution." *Id.* We agree.

B.

The Ninth Circuit opinion notes the weight of contrary authority among the other circuits and then cites as its authority only three cases. None of these cases, in our view, are dispositive or persuasive regarding the question presented.

Lokey v. Richardson, 600 F. 2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1979), *cert. denied,* 449 U. S. 884, is a case which neither addresses nor resolves this question. In *Lokey* the court simply acknowledged the holdings in *Meachum v. Fano, supra,* and *Montanye v. Haymes, supra,* and stated that "[u]ntil appellant has had an opportunity to explore and present his case with respect to state-created expectations, we cannot say his complaint failed to state a proper claim." *Id.* at 1267.

Lamb v. Hutto, 467 F. Supp. 562, 566 (E. D. Va. 1979), does conclude that the simple existence of state pre-transfer procedures creates a federal due process right to those procedures. However, that case never discusses the question of whether a state statute or regulation in any manner restricted the prison officials' determination regarding the transfers in question so as to create a *substantive* right in the prisoner not to be transferred. The failure of the court in *Lamb* to address that issue, in our view, totally flaws its holding.

In *Sherman v. Yakahi,* 549 F. 2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1977), the court repeats the following language from *Morton v. Ruiz,* 415 U. S. 199, 235 (1974), without further analysis. "Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures." In *Morton,* however, this Court was concerned with having a

federal court enforce and require compliance with the procedural rules of a *federal* agency. We do not believe this theory compels the federal courts to be responsible for the enforcement of state agency procedures in the absence of those procedures affecting a substantive liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.

IV.

The Purpose of State Procedures

It is clear that the purpose of Hawaii's pre-transfer procedure is to provide the ultimate decisionmaker with as much information and advice relative to his decision as possible. It does not appear to be contested that the ultimate decision to transfer the respondent, based upon that information and advice, was substantively correct.

We urge this Court to consider what practical good it does to create potential federal liability in a situation in which no substantive federal concern is involved. This Court has repeatedly noted that there is no constitutional mandate for states to limit the discretion of their correctional administrators. *Wolff v. McDonnell, supra; Meachum v. Fano, supra.* Furthermore, this Court has urged the district and circuit courts to recognize the fact that many of the decisions faced by prison personnel are best left to people with experience in correctional administration. *Bell v. Wolfish,* 441 U. S. 520 (1979). Under these circumstances it would not appear constructive to penalize a technical failure within a state system created to accomplish a laudable end.

The ultimate result of intervention by the federal courts in such non-substantive areas might well be the

elimination of formal information gathering procedures at the state level such as the procedure in question here. We would then be left with state officials holding the same unfettered discretion already recognized and deferred to by this Court in *Meachum v. Fano, supra,* and *Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, supra,* without, perhaps, as reliable a source of information upon which to base these discretionary decisions as formal procedures might provide.

We urge the federal courts not to assume a posture that will actively discourage states from formalizing information gathering procedures to assist administrative personnel in making an enlightened and informed exercise of their admittedly discretionary powers. If one of the touchstones of due process is "protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government" (*Wolff v. McDonnell, supra* at 558), certainly we move no closer to that goal by discouraging states from creating procedures to diminish the potential for arbitrary action. This is particularly true where the decision which is to be ultimately made does not implicate the Due Process Clause. *Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra* at 7.

The logic of the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case, if not reversed, leads inexorably towards entanglements and conflicts between the states and the federal government in non-substantive areas. This Court has previously acknowledged that such a path is unacceptable.

> To hold [such procedures] are within reach of the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would place the Clause astride the day-to-day functioning of state prisons and involve the judiciary in

issues and discretionary decisions that are not the business of federal judges.

Meachum v. Fano, supra at 228, 229.

———o———

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons we urge this Court to reverse the decision below and approve the determination of the district court in dismissing this action.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL L. DOUGLAS
Attorney General of Nebraska

J. KIRK BROWN
Assistant Attorney General

2115 State Capitol
Lincoln, NE 68509-4906
Tel: (402) 471-2682

Attorneys for Amici

APPENDIX

ATTORNEYS GENERAL SIGNING AS *AMICI*

Wilson L. Condon
Attorney General of Alaska
State Capitol, Pouch K
Juneau, Alaska 99811
907-465-3600

Robert K. Corbin
Attorney General of Arizona
Anthony Ching, Solicitor General
1275 West Washington
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
602-255-4266

Jim Smith
Attorney General of Florida
State Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32304
904-487-1963

David H. Leroy
Attorney General of Idaho
State House
Boise, Idaho 83720
208-334-2400

William J. Guste, Jr.
2-3-4 Loyola Avenue
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
504-568-5575

William A. Allain
Attorney General of Mississippi
Carroll Garton Building
P. O. Box 220
Jackson, Mississippi 39205
601-354-7130

Michael T. Greely
Attorney General of Montana
State Capitol
Helena, Montana 59601
406-449-2026

Paul L. Douglas
Attorney General of Nebraska
2115 State Capitol
Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-4906
402-471-2682

Richard H. Bryan
Attorney General of Nevada
Heroes Memorial Building
Capitol Complex
Carson City, Nevada 89710
702-885-4170

Irwin I. Kimmelman
Attorney General of New Jersey
State House Annex, Second Floor
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
609-292-4925

Jeff Bingaman
Attorney General of New Mexico
Bataan Building
P. O. Box 1508
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501
505-982-6000

Rufus L. Edmisten
Attorney General of North Carolina
P. O. Box 629
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
919-733-3377

Robert Wefald
Attorney General of North Dakota
State Capitol
Bismarck, North Dakota 58505
701-224-2210

William J. Brown
Attorney General of Ohio
State Office Tower
30 West Broad Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215
614-466-3376

Dennis J. Roberts, II
Attorney General of Rhode Island
Providence County Court House
Providence, Rhode Island 02903
401-274-4400

Mark V. Meierhenry
Attorney General of South Dakota
State Capitol Building
Pierre, South Dakota 57501
605-773-3215

William M. Leech, Jr.
Attorney General of Tennessee
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 37219
615-741-6474

John J. Easton
Attorney General of Vermont
Pavilion Office Building
Montpelier, Vermont 05602
802-828-3171

Gerald L. Baliles
Attorney General of Virginia
101 North 8 Street, 5th Floor
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071

Kenneth O. Eikenberry
Attorney General of Washington
Temple of Justice
Olympia, Washington 98504
206-753-2550

Chauncey H. Browning
Attorney General of West Virginia
State Capitol
Charleston, West Virginia 25305
304-348-2021

Bronson C. La Follette
Attorney General of Wisconsin
State Capitol Building
P. O. Box 7857
Madison, Wisconsin 53702
608-266-1221

Steven F. Freudenthal
Attorney General of Wyoming
123 State Capitol
Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002
307-777-7841

Judith W. Rogers
Corporation Counsel
District of Columbia
Corporation Counsel's Office
District Building
14th & E Street N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20004
202-727-6252

Aviata F. Fa'alevao
Attorney General of American Samoa
P. O. Box 7
Pago Pago, American Samoa 96799
684-633-4163